Socio-economic rights in applicable international trade law by Lanfranchi, Marie-Pierre
Socio-economic rights in applicable 
international trade law 
MARl E-PI ERRE LAN FRANCHI * 
Senior lecturer at the Faculty oj Law and Political Science, University oj 
Aix-Marselile III 
When one starts to look at the protection of socia-economic rights, there 
is one specific and sensitive question arising. This question is both classi-
cal and up-to-date: it relates to commercial relations between states. 
From a practical point of view, links between trade and social or labour 
norms have been enlightened a long time ago. This was one of the very 
reasons for the creation of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 
1919' Since, this question has become part of the debate in many 
international negotiations, either on a regional level (European Union, 
European Cooperation and Development Organisation, North American 
Iree trade agreement (NAFTA) or on a universal level (lLO or World 
Trade Organization (WTO) for instance) Interactions between trade and 
legal social rules have a twofold economical and ethical dimension. 
From an ethical point of view, some advocate that freedom of exchange 
or of movement (oF goods, services etc) encourages or excuses social 
injustice: indeed, it imposes on a state to trade with any other state, 
including those applying very low standards of SOCial prOtection, or 
those applying none. From an economic point of view, links are even 
more complex and controversiaJ.'- Amongst the recurring themes, some 
say [hat differences between systems of social protection generate 
competition inequalities. On the one hand, states applying weak or low 
social standard regulations beneFit from a comparative advantage re-
garded as unfair by other states. These latter view these weak or low 
standards as being a form of dumping that should be sanctioned (social 
dumping). On the other hand, states sticking to a high standard of social 
protection are suspected by others of applying a form of disguised 
protectionism: by linking trade to high social standards, these states aim 
at a protectionist objective without saying so. Links between trade and 
social norms send protagonists back to a debate based on the dynamics 
between social dumping and protectionism. 
Dr Marif~-Pierre I.anfrafl(:hi leaches public inlernallonallaw, eCOIlCJllllC ilHernatlOnallaw 
alld especially tlie Idw of the World Trade OrganlSaLJOn. She hdS published several ani-
dieS in these field.., <lnd <lIsa in the field of imernd(JOnal environmental law. 
1 See eg Robert 1991 at 148 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
This question, as one can easily understand, enlightens an important {en· 
sian, a fundamemal breakpoint: the opposition between Nonhern coun-
tries and Southern countries. The sharing line between states having "high 
standard" and those having "low standard" social legislation is roughly the 
same as the one dividing Northern and Southern coumries. The issues 
deriving from such a debate on a worldwide basis are then highly politi-
cised and it becomes difficult for states to agree on common legal rules 
and standards. These concrete economical and ethical imeranions be-
tween trade and the global environment cannot be easily transformed into 
a legal rule or standard. 
Prom a legal point oj view. one can wonder if international trade rules 
applicable between states take into consideration the protection of socio-
economic rights. In mher words, does WTO law integrate such a dimen-
sion? WTO law constitutes a tough and complex set of international 
agreements called the Marrakech Agreement. There are more than 60 
binding texts altogether. The Marrakech Agreement includes the agreement 
instituting the WTO. to which four annexes related to various senors of 
international trade are attached: agreement on trade on goods (this is the 
revised version of the GATT 1947 that still constitutes the core of applica-
ble rules to trade on goods), agreement on trade on services, agreement 
on dumpmg and agreement on state aid. 
According to the preamble of the WTO Charter. the aim of the organisa-
tion is mJinly economical ("increase of incomes and demand, increase of 
production and trade"); but is also social ("increase of life standing. full 
employment"), and these tWO objectives should be reached by respecting 
the objective of "sustainable development". This being said, the preamble, 
as everybody knows. has no legal binding effect and the terms of the 
agreemems give no compc[cnce w WTO organs in the social field. There is 
no specific legal basis for such a competence in the agreements. 
The general logic of WTO law is articulated around one principle and 
several exceptions. This principle is the one of free trade: objectives 
defined in the preamble will be achieved through the development and 
implementation of free trade. Precise legal rules define stale obligations in 
this regard. WTO law nevertheless include several other flexible solutions 
derogating to the principle: most of these agreements. especially the 
central agreement on trade on goods (GATT), include some possible 
derogations when public interests issues are at stake. Then, for instance, 
WTO members will be entitled to commercial restrictions on behalf of 
health protection. environmental protection or public poliCY.' 
However. one can be struck by the lack of expliCit consideration for the 
protection of socio-economic rights by the texts, whatever is at stake - the 
prinCiple or the exceptions The protection of socio-economic rights is 
moreover not taken into consideration to define trade obligations of 
member states. Having said so, a number of provisions raise some ques-
tions, create grounds for debates, and even sometimes a case law. The 










































SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
analysis of these various aspects leads to a preliminary observation, ie 
how difficult it is to promote socia-economic rights in the Framework of 
WTO. 
This observation will not, however, end the debate. Beyond WTO legal 
rules (tnd their current implementcHion. another type of debate arises. 
WTO law is nO( an isolated body of rules. It applies in parallel and si-
multaneously to other kind of obligations thell Slates must comply with in 
the international sphere. Socia-economic rights are organised, promoted 
and proteCled in other international arenas (United Nations, and mainly 
ILO); consequently, the issue of articulation between the two bodies of 
rules - WTO/other internaLional binding rules - should be raised and 
analysed. 
Should not WTO law be applied and interpreted taking inlO considera-
tion these other fules, and especially those made in the framework of the 
fLO? This would allow for the incorporation of a social dimension in 
international trade law. 
ThiS paper will be presented through (hree main points: Wha( is to be 
found in WTO agreements or, more exactly, what cannOL be found and 
whaL are the queslions deriving from this absence? How (lfe these agree-
ments currently applied? Does this evidence the difficullY to promote 
socia-economic rights in the framework of WTO? Finally. are there possi-
bilities to defend another interpretation and, if so, what are they? 
1 WHAT CANNOT BE FOUND IN WTO AGREEMENTS AND 
WHAT ARE THE QUESTIONS DERIVING FROM THIS 
ABSENCE? 
There Me at least three aspects. 
I. I WTO Agreements do not take Processes and Methods of 
Production (PMP) into consideration 
The promotion of trade is based on a key principle: the principle of non-
discrimination between similar products. This principle will have a two-
fold consequence. Firstly. Ihis principle implies that all advantages granted 
by one Sla(e 10 an imported product from another state should be ex-
tended [0 all other similar products imported from other states. This is the 
famous most favoured natIOn clause (article I. I GATT). Secondly. imported 
products shall not be treated in a discriminawry manner compared (0 
similar national products: this should be respected regarding taxes, excises 
and custom legal rules (article 111.2) but also in applying the rules relating 
to the sale of these products (article 1114). 
The implemencation of such rules begs one strategic question: which 
products would be considered as "similar"? Could two products, that 
would present equal physical characters. be considered as similar iF their 
processes of production are diFFerent? More specifically, can one consider 
that twO products are similar iF their processes of production do or do nOl, 
depending on the case, respect Fundamental socio-economic norms? IF 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
is made according to the law and cannot consequently be forbidden or 
restricted by one state. On the contrary, jf (he answer [0 such a question 
is negative, discriminatory treatment becomes possible and legal restric-
tions therefore become acceptable. 
The question of similarity between products is consequently a key issue 
and illustrates the fact that state obligations related to trade are linked to 
the interpretation of such provisions. 
However, none of the WTO agreements gives a definition of "similar".4 
The question remains unanswered. 
1.2 WTO Agreements include no "social clause" 
General exceptions to trade of goods are provided by article XX of the 
GATT 1994. This article lists ten cases where it is possible to derogate to 
free trade. None of them deals with the "social clause". Nothing schedules 
that a WTO member could impose free trade restrictions to promote 
socio·economic rights. Article XX(a) obviously provides for derogation on 
behalf of public morality or policy; article XX(e) also allows a state to 
oppose imports of goods "made in jail". but these are not strictly speaking 
"social clauses". 
If one accepts a wide definition of socio·economic rights. as including 
components like "health" and "environment". it must be helpful to men· 
tion article XX b) and xXg), authorising trade restrictions necessary to 
protect both. However. the important question to be raised here is 
whether these clauses have an extra-territorial effect. In other words, 
could they be used by one state to promote the protection of health and 
environment outside the sphere of state competencies? Once again the 
text does not give an answer to this question, 
A final question, related to dumping. should be raised regarding the 
content of WTO agreements. 
1.3 The dumping agreement does not explicitly cover social 
dumping 
As fdr as a low social standard system gives a comparative advantage 
judged unfair by certain states. the question is whether WTO legal provi-
sions related to dumping are applicable. If the answer is yes. then it would 
allow a WTO member to apply protection measures by raising anti· 
dumping duties. Authorised retaliation measures would allow - and only 
allow - increasing the price of products at stake. This is logical as only 
dumptng on price is taken into consideration. ie selling a product by 
under'pricing in comparison to its "normal value" (article VI GATT 1994 
and article 2 of the anti·dumping agreement). But what is the "normal 
value or price"? Does the normal value or price include, for example, (he 
normal cost of working? Once again, there is no specific answer in the 
text. 
4 There is however Olle eXCt!ptlOn: ttus is ttlC <HHi·dumping agrecment (an 2,6), glvlIlg d 










































SOCIO~ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL TRADE lAW 
All these questions have been explored in judicial and diplomatic prac-
tices. This is the second point we will now raise. 
2 THE CURRENT APPLICATION OF WTO AGREEMENTS DOES 
NOT ALLOW FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS 
One could summarise the situation in the following manner: Processes 
and Methods of Production are not taken into conSideration; the integra-
tion of a social clause is not on the agenda and the dumping agreement 
does not cover social dumping. 
2.1 Processes and methods of production are not taken into 
consideration 
From 1952 onwards, the issue of whether a state can subordinate its 
import to respect the social norms of the country of origin has been 
raised. The panel of expens presiding over such a dispute between Bel-
gium (defendant) and Denmark and Norway gave ~ negative answer, but 
without giving the reasoning leading to that solution". 
The question was then raised in two similar cases in 1990 and 1994: 
the Dolphin/Tuna cases, between the United States and Mexico in 1991 
and the United States and the European Community in 1994"'. In these 
two cases, the issue at stake was related to the US decision not to import 
tuna from Mexico and the European Community any longer, because 
these fjsh were deemed not to be caught according to environmental 
protection standards (the techniques used were regarded as harmful to 
dolphins. which mammal is protected by US legislation).' The United 
States considered (he GATT provisions as non-binding on them, as the 
imported tuna fish was not a similar prOduct to the American tuna fish. (In 
one case, the production process is regarded as environmentally harm-
less, while in the other it is not.) 
The panel of experts in these two cases rejected the US argument, using 
a textual interpretation of (he GATT. The panel considered GATT article III 
as only looking at products and not Processes and Methods of Production. 
One state cannot grant a less favorable treatment to similar products after 
only taking into consideration a non~compatible process of production 
with municipal policies of the import country. 
Behind this technical debate, and beyond the neutral and soft justifica-
tion put forward by the panel of experts in the two repons. there is a 
fundamental issue, especially evidenced by Venezuela in the first case 
(Venezuela intervened in the procedure as a third party): accepting the US 
~ Allocatwns fanll/ia/t's belges. rupporr du sous-qrollpl! des reclamafions tlIfopre Ie 
7 novembrt' 1952 
6 US v Mexico /JofphlnlTrma Case (case /) 3 Seplelllber [991 (DS21/R 3951 J 74); US v. EC 
Dolphm/Tuna Case (case II) 16 June [994 {DS29/Rl 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
argument would have meam accepting that any st3(e could use the "fac-
ulty to justify its unilateral economic and social or employmem norms as 
criteria to accept or not imports".8 It is also obviously noteworthy to 
mention that, one year after the first of the two cases, the GATT will adopt 
the conclusions presented by Venezuela: 
The GATT system imposes no constraints on the right that member states have 
to protect their own environment against any damage deriving from either 
their methods of production or the consumption of imported products 
however, when environmental problems derive from methods of production 
and consumption observed by another state, the GATT entails more constraints 
because it prohibits to set up conditions to get access to markets, or to make it 
dependent from political changes or from national practices in the export coun-
try Admitting the opposite solution would lead to authorise one state to impose its 
own social, environmental, economic policies. or to use them in aq manner that 
would reduce the competition between imported and national product 
One can see that such a problem is a very difficult one as the sovereignty 
of the state of origin (of the product) is here at stake. Admitting the US 
argument would equate to recognising that Northern states have universal 
jurisdiction over these standards, allowing them LO export their social 
standards to Southern countries. Neither the WTO law, nor public inter-
national law would admit such a possibility. 
This case law very interesti~~ly evolved in 200 I, within the framework 
of the second Shrimps case. Facts and implicated states were quite 
similar to those in the Tuna/Dolphins cases. What was at stake in this case 
was also an American trade restriction, but based on shrimps and turtles, 
in a dispute between the US and Malaysia (once again a Northern/Southern 
dispute). The contentious trade measure imposed a certain fishing method 
on shflmp imported from America: the importing state had to prove that 
its fishing method was harmless for turtles, these animals being protected 
by several international agreements because of their scarCity. 
The US won their case but the adopted legal reasoning is cautious and 
sers up conditions. The US measure is only accepted because it fulfils two 
conditions: firstly, it is a flexible measure, which imposes on exponing 
states not the adoption of the American fishing methods (that would be an 
obligation of using certain means) but the adoptlon of ecological fishing 
methods (ie an obligation to reach a certain result, leaving a more signi-
ficant margin of appreciation to exporting states); Secondly, the measure 
was accompanied by international negotiation which led to an interna-
tional regional convention protecting turtles. The US measure was conse-
quently not strictly unilateral. 
Moreover, this solution has been adopted in the framework of non-
ecological processes of production, but it is doubtful that it would apply to 
social clauses. The solution is based on the fact that the GATT contains 
H I'kp0r[, S 4.27 
<} GATT report j ()92 <11 l!) 
[0 linilcd Stutes v. Maluysia - Import Prohibition of Cerrwn Shrimp and Shnmp Products 22 










































SOCIO-ECONOMIC R[GHTS IN APPUCABLE INTERNATIONAL TRADE tAW 
such an ecological clause (article XX(g)) , allowing member states to dero-
gate to free trade on behalf of environmental protection. There is an 
environmental clause and the Shrimps report is based on this clause. 
There is no equivalent clause in the social field and the adoption of such a 
clause is no longer on the agenda. 
2.2 The integration of a social clause is no longer on the 
agenda 
States in favour of a social clause considered for a while that article XX(e) 
(prohibiting the import of "items produced in prisons") could be an accurate 
legal basis for such a clause; a purposive interpretation of article XX(e) could 
allow, for instance, to extend such a derogation to all kind of goods pro-
duced through forced labour or by an exploited and underpaid labour force. 
However, article XX (e) has never been used or invoked. In the same 
way, a purposive interpretation of article XX(a) (related to the protection 
of public policy or morality) would beg the conclusion that child labour 
and, more generally. indecent working conditions would be contrary [Q 
public morality. Such an interpretation would however be problematic. 
r:or instance, in the Tuna/Dolphins 1I case, the European Community and 
the Netherlands intervened by supporting the idea that a purposive inter-
pretation of article XX(a) would lead to "a partial approach in the name of 
public morality. such a notion depending to a large extent on specific 
cultural and religious traditions". j j Further, it remains doubtful that such a 
clause would have extraterritorial effect; ie, even if it would allow a WTO 
member to adopt measures aimed at protecting public morality, such 
measures would not faj] into the state municipal jurisdiction. Finally, such 
an interpretation would not be consensual, as the inclusion of a social 
clause is no longer (through regular amendments of the agreements) on 
the agenda 
The US and the European Community advocated for such an interpreta-
(ion wi(h differem reasoning, espeCially (hrough the ministerial confer-
ences of Singapore (1996) and Seatlie (1999). As (he initiative came from 
two major trade powers, Southern countries saw a new form of protec-
tionism, a threat to their sovereignty and their possibility of development. 
Developing countries reacted through a radical opposition to such pro-
posaL They refused the creation of an ad hoc working group to study links 
between trade and fundamental social norms. This issue is one of the 
main reasons for the failure of the Seatrle conference. 
The debate on this issue is roday at a s[andstill. The declaration adopted 
by WTO members during the ministerial conference in Doha (November 
200 I) is clear: 
We reject the use of labour norms with protectionist goals and convene that 
comparative advantage, especially for developing countries with low salaries, 
should not be threatened in any manner. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Finally, concerning the - already existing and more targeted - "health" 
and "environmental" clauses, could they produce extra-territorial effects?12 
The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO (DSB) never gave an opinion on 
this difficult question, which also is, as one can imagine, a source of 
division between Northern and Southern countries. In its reports Shrimps I 
& /I, the Appellate Body did not directly mention the question, It is true 
that American measures imposing an ecological obligation on trade part-
ners with the LJS have been certified. However, it is no less important to 
mention that marine turtles (ie a non-territorialised resource) are a pro-
tected resource. 
A last question will now be examined: the one related to dumping, 
Diplomatic practice shows that the dumping agreement does not cover 
social dumping. 
2.3 The dumping agreement does not cover social dumping 
States do not accept an interpretalion of dumping that does not cover 
social dumping. 
Any contrary solution would probably be difficult to apply on an eco· 
nomical point of view. Taking into consideration social dumping would 
mean that there is an "abnormal" labour cost, such a cost would affect the 
"normal value" of the concerned product. But is it possible to evaluate the 
"normal labour cost"? f..fOfCOVCf, taking into consideration social dumping 
would also raise ethical questions. It would allow ['or the setting up of anti-
dumping excise duties. However, even if such rights would without any 
doubt protect undertakings from the importing state. they would have no 
direct positive effect on workers, who may be victims of social injustice. 
There is no practice at all in this regard. 
The current implementation of these agreements indicates that the 
promotion of socio-economic rights through trade measures is inexistent 
or inefficient. 
The only one way would be to promote another type of interpretation 
of WTO agreements. This aspect will constitute the third and final point. 
3 TOWARDS ANOTHER ROUTE TO INTERPRET WTO 
AGREEMENTS 
WTO law is not an isolated body of rules. It is a field of law integrated in 
public international law, tt is necessary and possible to interpret it taking 
into consideration fundamental social norms adopted in other interna-
tional forums. This is not an easy way to go: the DSll of the WTO must 
['irst accept it. WTO judicial bodies are to playa key role in this regard. 
This is a difficult, but possible, route to go. 
I). See {he Asbestos ca~e: l:"lIrupeall CurnmwlIties v. CI.II1I)(II.I. Mel.lsures Alfecting lhe ProhilJl-
lioll qf AsiwsllJs anri Asbestos Products WT/[)Sl Y> appellare body report. 10 March 200 I, 
sec also (he Shrzmps/wrties case l. United States v. india. Malaysia. P(lkisCrln and Fhailand 
- {mporr ProhiiJicion of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prodllcts WT/I)S5H appellate body 










































SOCIO·ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
3.1 A difficult route 
The DSB has no general competence, bue only competencies granted by 
the Agreements: it accomplishes its duties according (0 the Dispute Set-
Ilement Understanding (DSU). However. the DSU does indicate In a very 
clear manner that all bodies (panels of expens, Appellate Body) fulFil their 
duties according (0 the relevant provisions of WTO Agreements (article 
7. I of the DSU). In other words, the aim of the dispute settlement system 
being to maintain a balance in providing security and predictability LO [he 
multiiaterallrading system, Ihe DSB cannot add or diminish the rights and 
obligations of WTO Members, as stated in the agreement (arlicle 3.2 & 3.4 
of the DSU). 
Finally, it goes without saying that the DSB cannot in any manner 
amend the agreements, this competence being formally and classically 
granted to the supreme political body, the WTO ministerial conference. 
In conclusion, the margin of appreciation of the DSB seems limited. For 
the DSB, the difficulty lies in the deFinition of its policy regarding its own 
case law: what social norms could carry weight in a speCialised trade 
international organisation created to settle trade disputes? What kind of 
weight could be granted to social norms when WTO members expressed, 
inside the organisation and outside (through the fLO), their refusal to use 
social norms as protectlonist measures and to challenge the existing 
comparative advantage between developing and developed countries? 
The DSB is consequently in a difficult position. At the same time, WTO 
is a very attractive organisation as its rules are enforced in a quick and 
efficient manner, approximating judicial enforcement I~ 
Numerous cases related to the implementation of WTO agreements bur 
concerning other topiCS - usually linked to general interests matters like 
health, environment and social norms - are consequently being referred 
to the DSB. The Hormones· 4 or Asbestos cases, the pending cases related to 
Genetically Modifidied Organisms (GMO), illusLrale this siluation. The DSB 
is referred to and must respond to these questions. In a general context of 
challenge of globalisation, this is an issue WTO cannot escape; this is not 
only a question related to the policy of the organisation, but to its survival. 
At the same time, there are possibilities to interpret WTO law in accor~ 
dance with social norms 
3.2 A possible route 
Several concurring elements can be put forward. 
First element: it derives from the methods of interpretation adopted by 
the DSB. It would deeply influence decisions adopted by the DSB. 
The methods of interpretation are today known and well functioning. 
They derive from article 3.2 DSU, referring (0 "customary interpretation 
13 See eg MARCEAU 2002 a( 760 
J 1 European Communl/ies v. US and Canada ., Measures A/Jeefing Meat tOut Meal Prodlll'ls 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY I< DEVELOPMENT 
rules of public inrernaLional law". There is a clear reference to interpreta-
tive rules of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of "eaties. As a 
matter of fact, adopted repons since 1996 fully comply with these rules. 
This entails a two~fo[d consequence. First of all, the interpretaLive method 
adopted by the DSB is perfectly foreseeable. It constitutes a guarantee for 
legal certainty. Secondly, taking into consideration other rules of public 
International law is possible: article 3 J (3c) clearly provides that the inter-
preter must rake into consideration "aJl relevant rules of international law 
applicable between the parties". In a number of cases, the DSB effectively 
took into consideration international agreements not linked with WTO. as 
well as factual elements that can justify and explain its own solution (The 
/.ome Convention in the Banana Case,'" the regional environmental agree-
ments in the Shrimps Cases) The very first repon (US Reformulated Gaso-
line in 1996'°) indicates, in a very general manner, that "WTO law should 
not be Interpreted by isolating it from public international law". This kind of 
wording has been used repeatedly. 
Second element the preamble of WTO agreement. It was earlier men-
tioned that the preamble of WTO contains social objectives (increased 
standard of living conditions and full employment realisation) and that 
these two objectives should be reached with respect to sustainable devel-
opment. The idea of sustainable development includes an environmental, 
but also a human, dimension. However, the WTO case law takes this 
preamble into consideration when it is necessary to balance economic 
objectives with general or public interests (like health or environment) In 
its report fo the Shrimps I Case, the Appellate \lody clearly states: 
Considering [hat [his Preamble represents [he intention of the negotiators to 
WTO Agreement, it should, accordmg to ourselves, enlighten, organll.ye and 
mi!igiltl: Ollr intl:rpreration of Agreements annexed to WIO Agreement. 
Third element: it is linked with the recent evolution 01' social international 
law. There is today a wide international consensus on minimum social 
standards. Several indicators testify to such consensus: the ILO 1998 
Declaration, which advocated a wide ratification of [LO conventions 
mentioned in the Declaration, the development of codes of conduct 
adopted by multinational companies, etc. WTO would be in a difficult 
position if it were to resist these evolutions_ Accordingly, some notions 
from the CATT 1947, not amended since its creation, are still applicable 
and could be interpreted in a dynamic manner For instance, article XX(a) 
allows for some trade restrictions based on the protection of public mo-
rality In 1947, the drafters of the GATT certainly had in mind a claSSical 
vision of public morality as allowing, for instance, one party to forbid the 
import of obscene publicalions_ There is consensus today at least on the 
J:) Fu{()/won C()mmum/i!?s v. Ecuador. Glwtf'ma/u. lionduras, Mexico and the United Start's -
Ue!limt' for thl' Im/)orlafion. Sale ancllJismblltilJn of Bananas WTIDS27 appellate body re" 
pan, 9 Se[1!t"lllbf'r 1997 
J () Umlt-'d Stu(f-'S v. Venezut!l(/ and }~rasi{- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
G(/soline WT/I)S2 ilfal WlIDs4 appellale body report. 22 April 1996 










































SOCIO-ECONOMIC RlGHTS IN APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL TRADE tAW 
prohibition of child and forced labour. Does such an evolution influence 
the content of "public morality'" The Appellate Body of the WTO has 
already been faced with such a problem in the Shrimps Cases. It consid~ 
ered that the inlerprelation of the notion of "non renewable resources" as 
mentioned in GATT Article XX(g) should be made taking into account 
imernallonal environmental law. This is why it rejected the argumem 
supported by Thailand. proposing a more purposive interpretation based 
on the travaux preparatoires and [he sense of wording as used in 1947. In 
this case. the Appellate llody considered that the notion was not limited to 
mineral resources (1947 interpretation) but also included biological re-
sources. Similar reasoning and methodology would then allow for de~ 
fending the idea of "public morality". including ethical considerations 
linked [Q working conditions. 
In the same manner, if a WTO member had adopted trade measures, 
being invited to do so by the 11.0. would the DSB be able to declare them 
incompalible? An example is the sanctions against Myanmar - an excep-
tional situation - as requested by the International Labour Office, in the 
framework of a formal procedure It seems that the answer should be 
negative 
Fourth element: it derives from article J 3 DSU. This provision allows 
special groups to consult with experts on any kind of technical question. 
Such a possibility is also offered to the Appellate Body. This provision 
could perfectly be used to refer a technical question to the ILO. or also to 
admit the intervention of tracie unions or NGOs as amici curiae. Dispute 
settlement organs have a wide discretion in this regard. However, up to 
now, referral to amicus curiae has been scarcely and cautiously used. The 
ILO has never been consulted. even though the Abestos Case could have 
been an opponunity, where the health risk was only related to workers 
using this product. The dispute settlement organs are still very cautious 
regarding the use of such a possibility. but they nevertheless have this 
technical opportunity as their disposal. This should be followed up. 
Fiflh and last elemenr: evolution of the case law related to the relalion-
ship between tradc and environmcnt or trade and health protection. This 
evolution is observable and quite important- One can notice how the 
preamble influences interpretations made by the DSB: adopted reports in 
a number of cases illustrate how (he DSB mitigate its interpretations. 
These are not only words. For instance. it does what it says in the Shrimps I 
repon: it takes into consideration public interests goals in defining sta(es 
economic obligations. 
This acknowledgement of environmental and health issues is hopefully 
(he s(arting point to a further integration of social issues_ 
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